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Optional analytics needs your choice, not your identity

Draft for independent review — not a compliance certification.

This assessment describes proposed controls on a review-only code branch. It is not a statement that they are deployed. External PostHog forwarding remains blocked pending rights and retention verification.

Prepared 6 November 2026 · Next review 6 February 2027, or before a material processing change.

Refusing analytics does not restrict access

Onboarding measurement and page experiments are separate optional choices, both off by default. No analytics identifier, assignment or device vector is generated before consent. The standard landing page is control C.

In the proposed interface, Privacy settings lets you withdraw as easily as you agree. Tracking stops immediately in that browser; if offline, server deletion is explicitly shown as pending until retried.

We assess risk before adding collection

Only predefined event labels and enum properties are permitted. No prompts, documents, input text, email, raw URL, GPS, fingerprint or visitor IP is sent through the analytics transport.

Processing, necessity and proportionality

The two questions are where consenting visitors fail to complete onboarding and whether a declared page presentation improves its chosen outcome. Arbitrary autocapture, “just in case” storage, advertising profiles and sensitive inferences are excluded.

The exact allowlist is versioned in the shared analytics schema. Consent is not permission to collect everything. Daily identifier rotation and opt-in selection intentionally limit long-term funnels and statistical conclusions.

Data flows, retention and encryption

The browser sends purpose choices to the same-origin privacy service. A server-held encrypted consent mapping in Store A connects a random receipt to a daily rotating HMAC pseudonym. Separate Store B contains only pseudonymous events and minute timestamps.

Both privacy compartments use AES-256-GCM envelopes with the master key outside their data directories. Events expire after 30 days; grants expire after 180 days. Withdrawal removes local mapped events and token links; minimal proof of consent may remain for up to 180 days, subject to legal review.

This is pseudonymisation, not anonymity. One service process can currently access both compartments and their key. Independent access principals, physical storage, account-data encryption, backups and key recovery are outstanding infrastructure work.

Processors and network metadata

Proposed optional analytics processor: PostHog EU, documented as hosted in Frankfurt. Current hosting and delivery involve Oracle Cloud and Cloudflare. User-requested AI processing goes to the model providers selected for the service, not through analytics consent.

Contracts, subprocessors, support access, transfer safeguards and retention must be verified. Networks necessarily see connection IPs; we cannot promise that the edge never processes one. PostHog IP discard alone does not stop GeoIP processing; its cookieless IP/user-agent hash is not used.

Read-only checks found TLS 1.3 supported publicly, but TLS 1.2 is still accepted. TLS-1.3-only operation and encryption of all account/gateway/backup data are not achieved by this branch.

Outstanding risks must not be hidden

Risk to peopleSafeguard and remaining work
Silent or excessive collectionDefault-off granular consent and finite enums. Audit deployed pages, edge injections and legacy data before activation.
Re-identification or theftSeparate encrypted stores and rotating tokens. Same-process access, key custody and backup protection still need independent review.
Failed erasureLocal export, withdrawal and retention controls. External PostHog event deletion/export and restore reconciliation remain blockers; forwarding is absent.
Sensitive service contentExcluded from analytics. Healthcare use, actual Article 9 categories and model-provider processing need their own lawful basis and full assessment.

Where high residual risk cannot be mitigated, processing must not proceed without the required prior consultation with the Irish Data Protection Commission.

Access and erasure cover more than analytics

Proposed privacy routes export contact metadata and retained local analytics, and erase analytics/consent metadata. They do not constitute a complete export or erasure of chats, files, billing or external processors. Existing account deletion can archive workspaces; permanent-erasure policy remains unresolved.

For a request, correction, withdrawal problem or assessment feedback, contact [email protected]. You may complain to the Irish Data Protection Commission.

A DPO or counsel must review this before publication

Controller: Dzimplei Limited, Trinity Hall, Dartry Road, Dublin 6, Ireland (details supplied by the operator on 15 November 2026). Lawful-basis assessment, DPO designation, special-category service processing, processor terms, event necessity and risk acceptance are pending controller and qualified Irish adviser review. No independent certification or stakeholder consultation is claimed.

Article 35 requires DPIAs for likely high-risk processing; it does not require publication and is not hospital-specific. Treating all data as sensitive is voluntary. AES-256 and TLS 1.3 are chosen safeguards, not algorithms named by GDPR.

Full engineering DPIA · Data inventory · Primary-source research. Repository access may be required.